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UPDATE ON THE CERN
COMPUTING AND NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CONTROLS 
(CNIC)
ABSTRACT Over the last few years modern accelerator and experiment control systems have increasingly been based on commercial-off-the-shelf products (VME crates, PLCs, SCADA systems, etc.), on Windows or Linux PCs, and on communication 
infrastructures using Ethernet and TCP/IP. Despite the benefits coming with this (r)evolution, new vulnerabilities are inherited too: Worms and viruses spread within seconds via the Ethernet cable, and attackers are becoming interested in control systems. 
Unfortunately, control PCs cannot be patched as fast as office PCs. Even worse, vulnerability scans at CERN using standard IT tools have shown that commercial automation systems lack fundamental security precautions: Some systems crashed during 
the scan, others could easily be stopped or their process data be altered [1]. During the two years following the presentation of the CNIC Security Policy at ICALEPCS2005 [2], a “Defense-in-Depth” approach has been applied to protect CERN’s control 















































Controls networks meet campus / business networks
► Proprietary field busses (PROFIBUS, ModBus)
replaced by Ethernet & TCP/IP (PROFINET, ModBus/TCP)
► Field devices connect directly to Ethernet & TCP/IP
► Real time applications based on TCP/IP
Migration to the Microsoft Windows platform
► MS Windows not designed for industrial / control systems
► OPC/DCOM runs on port 135 (heavily used for RPC)
► STEP7, PL7 Pro, UNITY, WINCC, VNC, PCAnywhere, …
Use of IT protocols & gadgets
► eMails, FTP, Telnet, SNMP, HTTP (WWW), … directly on e.g. a PLC




CERN TOCSSiC Vulnerability Scans [1]
31 devices from 7 different manufacturers (53 tests in total)














Situation improved a bit 
since ICALEPCS2005 [1]
Equipment being affected or even destroyed
► Some very expensive, esp. in experiments & accelerators
► Sometimes impossible to repair / replace
Processes being disturbed
► High interconnectivity, thus very sensitive to disturbances
A cooling process PLC failure can stop the accelerator
A power controller failure can stop a (sub-)detector
► Difficult to configure
Time being wasted
► Downtime reduces efficiency (esp. data loss in experiments)
► Time needed to re-install, re-configure, test and/or re-start 
► Requires many people working, possibly outside working hours
S. Lüders on behalf of the CNIC WG
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“Defense-in-Depth” means security on each layer:
…of the security of the device itself, …of the firmware and operating system, …of the network connections & protocols, …of the software applications 
(for PLC programming, SCADA, etc.), …of third party software, and …together with users, developers & operators.
CERN’s solution is based on the “Good Practice Guidelines Parts 1-7” of the U.K. Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI) [3].
People are always the weakest link.
► Need for a proper, coherent, and CERN-wide access control
► Ensuring traceability of access (who, when, and from where)
► Passwords must be kept secret: beware of “Google Hacking”
► In exceptional cases using strong authentication
SUMMARY Due to the continuing integration of common IT technology into 
control systems, the corresponding IT security vulnerabilities and cyber-attackers 
end up threatening control systems, and, thus, CERN’s operation and assets. 
However, control systems demand a different approach to security than office 
systems do.
This poster presents a thorough rule-set to secure CERN’s control systems. Its 
implementation uses a “Defense-in-Depth” approach based on network 
segregation, central installation schemes, authentication & authorization, user 
training, incident response & system recovery, and security auditing
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Development of a User-driven PC 
management
►Pass flexibility and responsibility
to the User
►HE decides
WHEN to install WHAT on WHICH
control PCs (instead of the IT people)
► IT will send out email notifications of 
new patches to be installed
►HE has to ensure security
►PCs might be blocked if threat for 
others
Web-based Computer
Management Framework (CMF) 
for Window XP and Windows 
Server [4]
Template-based Linux For Controls
(L4C) for CERN Scientific Linux 3/4 
using
… this works even for oscilloscopes !!!
Still problematic areas: e.g. problems controlling user privileges in commercial controls applications,
no generalization to one common central scheme at CERN, lack of access control in standard communication protocols 
Essential services are “trusted”:





Separate Network Domains for controls
►Domain Manager with technical responsibility
►Authorization procedure for new connections
►MAC address authentication
►Only operational devices,
but neither laptops nor wireless access points
►Additional protection for PLCs, etc.
►Network monitoring
►Statistics & intrusion detection
Restricted and controlled inter-
communication
►Traffic filtering (based on ACLs)
►Application gateways plus DMZ
► Interactive access to the “outside”:
Restricted web-browsing, no e-mailing
►Only automatic, outgoing e-mails
►Rules for file transfers
►Disconnection point if threat for others
Remote interactive access
►From “outside”, i.e. office, wireless, home
►Windows Terminal Servers & SSH gateways
►Methods to access controls applications & 
control PCs (i.e. SSH, RDP, native PVSS)
From experience at CERN, only centrally managed and patched PCs have shown to be secure in the long run.
► Use centrally managed systems wherever possible
► Ensure prompt security updates: OS, applications, anti-virus, etc.
Automatic & network-based installation
►Centrally managed OS & applications
►User applications, settings, and Look & Feel
►Configuration of access rights & restrictions
On many PCs in parallel
Full remote control of…
► Installation & configuration
►Patching
►Reboots
Implementation of “Role Based Access Control”
► User credentials for authentication
► Role assignment for authorization
► Strict rules for remote access
► Posters by P. Chochula, S. Gysin, K. Kostro, A. Petrov [5]
Making security an objective
► Security training for users, operators, and system experts
► Bringing together IT and controls people
► Management buy-in due to incident at CERN’s magnet test-stand
► Manufacturers and vendors became part of the solution. Security 
demands will be soon included into orders and call for tenders
Discussion with governments, industry, and users
► Control System Cyber-Security (CS2/HEP) workshop [6]
► CERN is chairing the EuroSCSIE, with members from 
European governments, industry and research institutions 
that are dependent upon and, or whose responsibility it is 
to improve the security of SCADA and Control Systems.
Even with a stringent Security Policy incidents can never be prevented completely.
► Incident handling became part of CERN’s general procedures
► Handling incidents on a Domain have been and will be jointly performed by
CERN’s Computer Security Team and the corresponding Domain Administrator
► The acting Computer Security Officer has the right to take appropriate actions in justified emergency cases
► CERN’s Central Installation Schemes CMF and L4C allow for prompt system recovery
Keeping and raising the level of security
► Annual reviews of the CNIC Security Policy and its implementation planned for the future; the last being held in summer 2007
Control Systems:
Era of Legacy Technology
(“Security through Obscurity”) Era of Modern
Information Technology
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